






Subregional Headquarters in Mexico 
 


















Possible transmission of 
adverse shocks from the recent 
financial crisis to Central America 




S E D E  S U B R E G I O N A L  
D E  L A  C E P A L  
E N  
MÉXICO 
141 estudios y perspectivas 
  S
   
 E
   
 R
   
 I
   
 E
 





Copyright © United Nations, February 2013. All rights reserved 
Printed in United Nations, Mexico City, Mexico 
 
Member States and their governmental institutions may reproduce this work without prior authorization, but are requested to 
mention the source and inform the United Nations of such reproduction. 
This document has been prepared by Willy Zapata, Chief of the Economic Development Unit and Kristina 
Eisele, Economic Affairs Officer of the Economic Development Unit, of ECLAC, Subregional Headquarters in 
Mexico, within the activities of the Working Program. 
The views expressed in this document, which has been reproduced without formal editing, are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Organization. 
 
CEPAL - Serie Estudios y perspectivas - México - N° 141 Possible transmission of adverse shocks from the recent … 
3 
Contents 
Abstract ..................................................................................................... 5 
I. Introduction ...................................................................................... 7 
II. Related literature.............................................................................. 9 
III. The effects of the financial crisis ................................................... 13 
IV. Explaining the decrease in trade; the role of trade finance ........ 17 
A. Global trade finance flows........................................................ 18 
B. Statistics on trade finance flows in Central America................ 20 
V. Future effects of the financial crisis on Central America ........... 23 
A. Legacy effects of the financial crisis and new risks ................. 24 
B. The effects of regulation........................................................... 26 
C. Strengths and weaknesses of the region ................................... 29 
VI. Policy recommendations ................................................................ 31 
VII. Conclusion ....................................................................................... 35 
References ............................................................................................... 37 
Serie estudios y perspectivas: Issues published.................................... 41 
 
CEPAL - Serie Estudios y perspectivas - México - N° 141 Possible transmission of adverse shocks from the recent … 
4 
Tables contents 
TABLE 1  MERCHANDISE TRADE EXPORTS FROM CENTRAL AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES, 2005-2011 .....................................................................................................14 
TABLE 2  MANUFACTURING TRADE EXPORTS FROM CENTRAL AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES, 2005-2010 .....................................................................................................15 
TABLE 3  MERCHANDISE TRADE IMPORTS TO CENTRAL AMERICAN  
COUNTRIES, 2005-2011 .....................................................................................................16 
TABLE 4  GDP GROWTH OF THE MAIN TRADING PARTNERS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES IN PERCENTAGES, 2005-2010 ...................................................................16 
Figures contents 
FIGURE 1 MERCHANDISE TRADE EXPORTS FROM CENTRAL AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES, 2005-2011 .....................................................................................................15 
FIGURE 2  PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS INDICATING DECREASES IN THE VOLUME  
OF TRADE FINANCE PRODUCTS FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR, 2008-2010 ..........19 
FIGURE 3  PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS INDICATING DECREASES IN THE VALUE  
OF TRADE FINANCE INSTRUMENTS FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR, 2009-2010 ...19 
FIGURE 4  PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS INDICATING INCREASES IN THE 
PRICE OF TRADE FINANCE PRODUCTS, 2008-2010 ....................................................20 
FIGURE 5  FINANCE FLOWS FROM FOREIGN BANKS TO CENTRAL AMERICAN 
BANKS ................................................................................................................................21 
FIGURE 6  ILLUSTRATION OF THE EFFECTS OF LOSSES FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
ON BANK LENDING..........................................................................................................26 
FIGURE 7 ILLUSTRATION OF THE EFFECTS OF HIGHER CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
(CR) FOR A BANK..............................................................................................................27 
 
 
CEPAL - Serie Estudios y perspectivas - México - N° 141 Possible transmission of adverse shocks from the recent … 
5 
Abstract  
In this paper we explore trade finance as a transmission channel of adverse 
shocks to Central America. We analyze data on trade and trade finance 
flows, and show that they largely follow the same pattern in the region. A 
contraction of trade finance supply to Central America will affect trade 
exports negatively, and consequently impact economic growth and jobs. 
While until now the region has weathered the financial and European debt 
crises relatively well, shocks may come from a further contraction of 
lending in developed countries. The lending contraction can arise from 
losses from the recent financial crisis that have not yet been fully 
recognized on the balance sheets of financial institutions, from regulatory 
changes in raising capital requirements, and from further adverse shocks, 
such as the lack of a solution to the euro area sovereign debt crisis, or 
from all of the above. Finally, we put forward policy recommendations to 
mitigate the risk of transmission of shocks through trade finance to 
Central America.  
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I. Introduction  
While some Latin American countries had negative growth rates during 
the financial crisis, the region on the whole weathered the crisis better 
than most developed countries. GDP in the region contracted by 1.9% in 
2009, compared to the 4% contraction seen in OECD countries over the 
same period. In 2010 the average GDP growth in Latin America and the 
Caribbean was 6%, while OECD countries grew by only 3.1% on average. 1 
Although the most recent financial crisis is seen as the worst crisis in 
decades, in contrast to previous periods of crises, Latin America did not 
experience currency and debt crises, and bank runs. Improved 
macroeconomic fundamentals and the perception of sound domestic 
banking systems helped to shield the region from the most severe effects 
of the crisis (Izquierdo and Talvi, 2010). The Central American countries 
also performed better than OECD economies on average, with a lower 
GDP contraction in 2009 and a higher growth rate in 2010. 
While Central America may so far have not been severely impacted 
by the financial crisis, this is no guarantee that the region will be able to 
escape its long term effects. The proposed global financial regulatory 
changes are significant, mainly in terms of raising capital requirements of 
financial institutions, which could have an impact on lending to 
developing countries. There are signs that global financial stability is once 
again deteriorating with the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area 
continuing. Developed country financial institutions are also still 
recovering from the losses of the recent financial crisis, which makes them 
vulnerable to further shocks and could reduce lending.  
                                                        
1  Data from World Bank World Development Indicators. 
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As the financial crisis has demonstrated, one of the defining features of the financial sector is 
interconnectedness. The problems in the US housing market quickly spread throughout the US financial 
sector and internationally. This interconnectedness between financial institutions nationally and 
internationally implies that Central America will experience the consequences of the problems in other 
regions. Considering that the financial crisis has impacted the availability and price of credit worldwide, 
trade finance could be a likely channel of contagion from other regions to Central America. Trade 
finance products are particularly important for developing countries, as they offer a higher level of 
security, in the case of documentary trade finance products such as letters of credit, and a way to access 
financing in the case of pre-export financing. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section II summarizes prior relevant research on trade finance 
and transmission channels. Section III examines the effects of the financial crisis on global and Central 
American trade flows. Section IV focuses on the link between trade flows and trade finance globally and 
in Central America, and analyses data from the period 2005 to 2011 on trade finance flows. In Section V 
we consider the future impacts of the financial crisis in Central America. Section VI gives policy 
recommendations to mitigate the risk of trade finance being a transmission channel for adverse shocks 
and section VII provides a conclusion. Throughout this paper we refer to Central America as Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic.  
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II. Related literature  
This paper explores the role of trade finance as a channel of transmission 
for future effects of the financial crisis to Central America. As part of this 
paper we also analyze the connection between trade finance and the 
decline of trade during the financial crisis both globally and in Central 
America. While our interest does not lie in the past effects of trade 
finance, but in its potential future impact, this paper is also part of the 
growing literature on the reasons for the decline in trade during the 
financial crisis. The decline in global trade was far greater than the 
decrease in global output and there have been a number of studies on the 
factors leading to the decline in trade from late 2008 onwards, with a 
particularly large body of work focusing on the decline of US imports. 
These studies are of specific interest to understanding the past and future 
effects of trade finance flows to Central America, given that the United 
States is the largest trading partner of many of the countries in the region. 
Chor and Manova (2009) found in their empirical study on monthly US 
imports between November 2006 and October 2009, that countries with 
higher interbank rates exported less to the United States than countries 
with more favorable credit conditions. Alessandria and others (2010) 
found evidence of the role of inventory adjustment in the decline of 
imports to the United States during the financial crisis, with this being 
particularly true for the automotive sector where the inventories had 
become fairly high relative to sales before the crisis. The empirical work 
of Levchenko and others (2010) on disaggregated data for US imports and 
exports suggests that the position of the sectors in the supply chain had an 
effect on the degree to which imports and exports declined, with a higher 
decrease taking place in sectors that are used as intermediate inputs. There 
have also been studies on the link between financial shocks and trade 
flows from emerging markets (Balakrishnan and others, 2011; Thomas, 
2009), which show that financial flows are an important transmission  
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mechanism of shocks. While Central American countries are not generally classified as emerging 
markets, the countries examined are closer to Central American countries than studies with advanced 
economies. 
Research has also been undertaken on the transmission channels of shocks in a more general 
context and not purely in the context of trade flows or emerging or developing countries. The financial 
channel is found to be significant in transmitting shocks within NAFTA, with it accounting for more 
than half of spillovers (Swiston and Bayoumi, 2008). Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003) analyzed bank 
lending data and found that banks’ exposures to Mexico in the Mexican currency crisis and to Thailand 
in the Thai currency crisis enhanced the transmission of shocks to third countries. This is the so-called 
common lender effect where a bank has to withdraw from a country after experiencing an unexpected 
loss in another country in order to meet its capital adequacy ratios or other regulatory requirements. 
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) have identified three possible transmission channels of liquidity shocks 
from global banks to emerging market countries distinguishing between the case of a foreign parent and 
a domestic affiliate and a domestically owned bank. 
Another aspect of an adverse liquidity shock to consider is credit rationing by banks. Credit 
rationing is understood as a situation in which there are groups of loan applicants who would not get a 
loan even if they offered to pay more, but would get a loan if the credit supply were greater (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). In their classic model Stiglitz and Weiss show how a bank would not want to increase the 
loan supply even if the loan applicants are willing to pay higher interest rates or to offer more collateral. 
The authors show that increasing the interest rates or accepting more collateral could increase the 
riskiness of the bank’s loan portfolio, ‘either by discouraging safer investors, or by inducing borrowers 
to invest in riskier projects’. 
The recent financial crisis was also a period of credit rationing by banks. The scarcity of credit 
was accompanied by credit rationing where lending to large corporations was preferred over what were 
perceived as riskier counterparties. What suffered in particular was lending to small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Artola and Genre (2011), for instance, show that in the euro area SMEs were more 
affected than larger companies by the scarcity of credit during the recent financial crisis. These types of 
companies, ‘have higher risk, more opacity, serious agency problems, and wider information 
asymmetries’, 2 making it harder for them to obtain credit during times of crisis. The work of Bustillo 
and Velloso (2012) also indicates that the financial crisis impacted particularly negatively on the access 
of Central American and Caribbean countries to international capital markets. They found that on the 
whole the Central American and Caribbean region has been more severely affected than the whole Latin 
American region when sovereign spreads, bond issuance, and credit ratings evolution are considered.  
Although there is a large body of work on the financial crisis and its effects, much less work has 
been undertaken on the potential future effects, in particular on the effects on developing countries. The 
financial crisis exposed severe weaknesses in the regulation of different financial sectors around the 
world, with issues ranging from inadequate risk management in financial institutions to inappropriate 
remuneration structures, which make changes urgent. Consequently, initiatives to reform financial 
regulation have been undertaken at national and international levels. We agree that there is an urgent 
need to regulate better in order to ensure that the financial sector functions in an appropriate way. 
However, what we also must do is understand the impact of the new regulations on Central America and 
take measures to mitigate any negative impacts. While the reforms will clearly benefit the financial 
sectors of the countries they concern, they can have wider unintended impacts, in particular for 
developing countries, Central American Countries can become casualties of war. There have been 
concerns over the effect of Basel III regulations on trade finance flows (WTO; World Bank; ICC). Basel 
III has the overall effect of raising capital requirements for financial institutions, which may have an 
impact on lending to developing countries. This may impact the availability of pre-export financing by 
banks in developing countries. With regard to documentary trade finance products, these are generally 
considered as some of the lowest risk products available, as they are highly collateralized and self-
                                                        
2  The SME Financing Gap (Vol. II), Proceedings of the Brasilia Conference, 27-30 March 2006, Part 1, OECD Publishing. 
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liquidating (Auboin, 2011). Yet some provisions of Basel III may have the effect of increasing the cost 
of this type of trade finance products (Auboin, 2011). The issue in particular is the introduction of a 
leverage ratio of 100% credit conversion factor on off-balance-sheet items, which include trade finance 
products such as letters of credit. The idea behind introducing this leverage ratio is to reduce excessive 
leveraging. However, trade finance products are not used for leverage, as long as they are backed by 
either goods or services (Auboin, 2011). Although the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision made 
some changes to Basel III in response to concerns over the cost and availability of trade finance, the 
provision on the leverage ratio was not amended because it is needed from a regulatory point of view. 
There has not been a great deal of analysis on the long term effects of the financial crisis on the 
balance sheets of financial institutions, their lending behavior and business models, and even less on 
how this will impact developing countries. Notwithstanding changes in capital requirements that will 
impact the cost and volume of lending, many financial institutions are also focusing on recovering from 
the losses they experienced during the financial crisis. It is also important to remember that although the 
world economy has started to recover, with world output growing by 4.2% in 2010, the sovereign debt 
crisis in the euro area continues and is already having a negative impact on the balance sheets of 
European banks. It could have deep repercussions for developing countries due to the interconnected 
nature of the international financial system. This is especially true for Latin America due to the presence 
of European banks in the region. The World Bank has lowered its growth expectations for 2012 in 
response to the euro area crisis and amid concerns that an escalation of the crisis would lead to both 
lower trade flows and a reversal of capital flows. The impact of the reversal of capital flows would hit 
Eastern Europe and Latin America hard given their outstanding debt payments. Massa and others (2011) 
discuss three broad categories of possible transmission channels of shocks in the euro area to developing 
countries: financial contagion, lower growth in the euro area economies and exchange rate movements. 
For instance, if euro area countries default on their debt, European banks would experience significant 
losses and could lower lending to developing countries in order to meet their capital requirements. 
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III. The effects of the financial crisis 
The financial crisis, which began from problems in the US sub-prime 
mortgage markets in mid-2007, led to a disruption of the financial 
intermediation role of financial institutions. Due to the repackaging of 
sub-prime mortgages into other products, the problems quickly spread 
around the financial system. Financial institutions became reluctant to 
lend because of the uncertainty over the location of risks within the 
financial system, as well as because of concerns over the extent of their 
own potential losses. Liquidity evaporated from the market despite 
injections of capital by central banks. With more and more financial 
institutions struggling with considerable losses, governments orchestrated 
nationalizations and bailouts to keep the financial system working. At the 
same time the financial crisis had a profound impact on the real economy 
with major economies entering into a recession in 2009. The world output 
grew by only 1.4% in 2008 and contracted by 2.3% in 2009. 3  
The crisis affected developing countries through several different 
channels. In Latin America remittances grew very little in 2008 and 
declined in 2009 (World Bank, 2011). This is an important effect, given 
that in many Central American countries remittances contribute 
significantly to GDP. Private financial flows, including interbank lending, 
and trade have been other channels of transmission of shocks to 
developing countries. Foreign bank lending to developing countries 
responded with a lag to the crisis, with a trough attained at the start of 
2009 (Adams-Kane and others, 2012).  
                                                        
3  Data from World Bank World Development Indicators.  
CEPAL - Serie Estudios y perspectivas - México - N° 141 Possible transmission of adverse shocks from the recent … 
14 
One of the main ways in which the effects of the financial crisis were transmitted to developing 
countries was through the reduced volume of global trade and through lower prices for commodities. 
According to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 led to a 
sharp decline in global trade starting from late 2008. In 2009 the volume of world merchandise exports 
declined by 12% percent from the previous year (WTO). Merchandise trade exports started to recover in 
2010 with an increase of 13.8% and, according to WTO preliminary figures, in 2011 world exports 
increased only by 5%. The WTO is estimating that the growth in world trade in terms of volume will 
slow further in 2012 to 3.7%, and increase again in 2013 to 5.6%.  
The flows of trade exports from Central America also decreased in response to the financial crisis, 
but the decline in value terms was smaller than that of world exports. Table 1 shows that merchandise 
exports from all Central American countries except from the Dominican Republic were increasing 
during the period 2005-2008. In the Dominican Republic exports were increasing from 2005 to 2007 and 
started to decline in 2008. Similar to aggregate global exports, the majority of the countries experienced 
a decrease in 2009, which was followed by an increase in 2010. The percentage decrease in exports 
between 2008 and 2009 varies between 5.5% and 22.2%, with no country experiencing a decline in 
value higher than the 22.4% decline in world exports, and with the average decline in Central America 
being 9.8%. Table 1 shows that Panama is the exception, as it did not experience a decrease in exports 
during the crisis. (Mainly re-exports from the free trade areas). 
TABLE 1 
MERCHANDISE TRADE EXPORTS FROM CENTRAL AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES, 2005-2011 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Costa Rica 7 026 8 200 9 337 9 504 8 784 9 385 10 408 
Dominican Republic 6 145 6 610 7 160 6 748 5 483 6 755 8 600 
El Salvador 3 418 3 706 4 015 4 641 3 866 4 499 5 309 
Guatemala 5 381 6 025 6 898 7 737 7 214 8 466 10 463 
Honduras 5 048 5 277 5 784 6 199 4 825 5 742 6 790 
Nicaragua 866 1 050 1 222 1 475 1 394 1 851 2 282 
Panama 7 050 8 034 8 821 9 817 10 717 10 987 14 100 
Source: World Trade Organization. 
Data is in US dollars at current prices (millions). 
Manufacturing was the hardest hit sector in global trade, with a decline in value of 20.1% in 2009. 
Manufacturing exports from Central America followed a similar pattern, with an average decline of 
16.4% for the region from 2008 to 2009. Given that a large part of the population of the Central 
American countries are employed in the manufacturing sector, the decline in manufacturing exports has 
a significant effect on employment. Table 2 shows that the percentage decline in manufacturing exports 
between 2008 and 2009 varies from 7% in Costa Rica to 26.9% in Panama. While in the global 
aggregate data the value of manufacturing exports recovers in 2010 with a growth rate of 19.6%, at 
country level in Central America the picture is mixed. The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Panama experienced growth in manufacturing exports from 2009 to 2010 and 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua experienced a further decrease. However, on the whole the manufacturing 
exports of Central America show a similar pattern to world manufacturing exports. The data on total 
merchandise trade exports from Central America and the data on manufacturing exports, therefore, show 
how trade exports from the region closely follow changes in world trade flows. 
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FIGURE 1 
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Source: World Trade Organization. 
Data is in US dollars at current prices (millions). 
TABLE 2 
MANUFACTURING TRADE EXPORTS FROM CENTRAL AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES, 2005-2010 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 08-09% change 
Costa Rica 4 571 5 376 5 583 5 929 5 514 5 488 -7.0 
Dominican Republic 4 951 5 187 4 546 4 185 3 293 4 104 -21.3 
El Salvador 2 690 2 860 2 986 3 352 2 701 3 219 -19.4 
Guatemala 3 052 3 316 3 424 3 630 3 107 3 607 -14.4 
Honduras 3 059 3 146 3 356 3 431 3 109 3 528 -9.4 
Nicaragua 85 87 117 151 126 116 -16.4 
Panama 87 102 120 100 73 91 -26.9 
Source: World Trade Organization. 
Data is in US dollars at current prices (millions). 
It is also of interest to examine the decrease of imports to Central America given that imports are 
used by the manufacturing and commerce sectors to produce goods and these sectors employ a large part 
of the population of the countries. Table 3 shows that, similar to exports, imports to the region declined 
between 2008 and 2009 and increased again in 2010. This is logical given that manufacturing exports 
declined during this period and that these types of companies are one of the main users of imports.  
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TABLE 3 
MERCHANDISE TRADE IMPORTS TO CENTRAL AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES, 2005-2011 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Costa Rica 9 824 11 548 12 952 15 372 11 395 13 570 16 220 
Dominican Republic 9 869 12 174 13 597 15 993 12 296 15 299 17 600 
El Salvador 6 690 7 663 8 821 9 818 7 325 8 498 10 118 
Guatemala 10 499 11 915 13 576 14 547 11 531 13 838 16 610 
Honduras 6 545 7 303 8 888 10 453 7 299 8 550 10 140 
Nicaragua 2 623 3 026 3 611 4 317 3 489 4 173 5 210 
Panama 9 600 10 775 13 269 15 737 13 877 16 737 21 600 
Source: World Trade Organization. 
Data is in US dollars at current prices (millions). 
The decrease in trade in Central America was disproportionate to the contraction of the global 
economy and to that of the main trading partners of Central American countries. Global GDP grew by 
only 1.4% in 2008 and contracted by 2.3% in 2009, 4 with the growth rate of the output of most of the 
main trading partners of Central American countries contracting by even more, as shown in table 4. At 
the same time, the average decrease in trade exports in Central America between 2008 and 2009 was 
9.8%. When the world economy started to recover in 2010, trade exports of most of the Central 
American countries started to increase, but except for Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama remained 
below their pre-crisis levels. 5 At the same time the GDP of the majority of the main trading partners had 
more or less returned to 2008 levels, with the exception of the European Union and Venezuela. One 
could therefore expect that the trade exports of Central American countries would have recovered to 
2008 levels. However, on the contrary we see a disproportionate decrease in trade exports in response to 
the crisis and a lower than expected increase during the recovery of the world economy. There have been 
suggestions that declining economic activity alone cannot explain the decline in trade and a contraction 
in the supply of trade finance could also be an important reason (e.g. Dorsey, 2009).  
TABLE 4 
GDP GROWTH OF THE MAIN TRADING PARTNERS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES IN PERCENTAGES, 2005-2010 
Country or Area 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
China 11.3 12.7 14.2 9.6 9.2 10.3 
European Union 1.9 3.2 2.9 0.4 -4.3 1.9 
Mexico 3.2 5.2 3.3 1.5 -6.1 5.5 
United States 3.1 2.7 1.9 0.0 -2.7 2.9 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 10.3 9.9 8.2 4.8 -3.3 -1.9 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
                                                        
4  Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
5  2008 is taken as the pre-crisis level of exports for all of the countries except for the Dominican Republic where 2007 is used as this 
was the pre-crisis peak year for the country. Much of the decrease in exports from the Dominican Republic between 2007 and 2008 
is attributable to a halt in ferronickel production.  
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IV. Explaining the decrease in trade; 
the role of trade finance 
In this section we explore the role of trade finance in the decline in trade 
from Central America and the potential future effects of the financial crisis 
through trade finance to Central America. We focus on the role of financial 
institutions in offering trade finance products. The wider definition of trade 
finance encompasses lending for trade facilitation by export credit agencies 
and multilateral development banks. Trade finance is generally understood 
as products offered by financial institutions to mitigate risks associated with 
trade, namely that the importer does not pay for the goods, or that the goods 
are not delivered to the importer, and to facilitate trade exports through pre-
export financing. The first type of products facilitates imports, giving the 
exporter greater security that the importer will pay for the goods. The most 
common documentary trade finance product is a letter of credit, which the 
importer’s bank would issue to the exporter as a guarantee that the exported 
goods will be paid for, provided that the exporter fulfils certain conditions. 
The bank intermediates between the two parties and transfers the funds once 
the conditions are met. These types of products are important for the 
manufacturing and commerce sectors of Central American countries, as 
these sectors import inputs for production. Not all trade transactions involve 
financial institutions since transactions can be also directly settled between 
the two counterparties through open account trading. However, it is 
estimated that 20% of world trade involves some type of documentary trade 
finance product offered by financial institutions, with the figure being 
higher for developing countries (ICC, 2009). The second type of products 
enables the exporters to have access to credit and to produce goods. The 
main and sometimes only requirement for banks to offer pre-export 
financing is for the exporters to have contracts set up with importers 
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known to the banker. Trade finance in the form of pre-export financing is particularly important for 
Central American countries as it is an important source of working capital for primary goods producers 
in Central America. These producers in turn are one of the main sources of employment in Central 
America. In general, trade finance can be particularly important for developing countries, such as the 
Central American countries that are the focus of this paper, because these countries tend to have more 
limited access to financing.  
Trade finance can help companies in developing countries access financing, with the companies 
only needing to have future contracts secured. The World Bank (2004) reports that in almost every year 
between 1980 and 2003, noninvestment-grade and developing countries have had a higher share of trade 
finance commitments in total bank lending than investment grade countries. Over time the share of 
investment grade countries has gradually declined highlighting how they can access other forms of finance, 
and how important trade finance is for developing countries. In addition, documentary trade finance 
products are particularly important for imports to developing countries because these products offer a 
higher level of security to the exporters that importers in developing countries will pay for the goods. 
An adverse liquidity shock could reduce trade finance flows to Central America. Cetorelli and 
Goldberg (2011) have identified three possible transmission channels of liquidity shocks from global 
banks to emerging market countries. In the case of a foreign parent with an affiliate in the emerging 
economy, a liquidity shock can either be transmitted through the parent decreasing cross-border lending 
to the affiliate, or through the parent actually borrowing from the affiliate through internal capital 
markets. In the case of a domestically owned bank the transmission channel is through the decrease in 
the cross-border interbank borrowing. During the recent years foreign banks have become more present 
in the banking systems of Central American countries, with the degree of penetration ranging from low 
in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic to very high in El Salvador (Wezel, 2010). In addition, 
Central American banks have also forged informal relationships with foreign banks (Singh, 2005). 
However, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) find that the key factor determining the impact on emerging 
markets is not the degree of openness of their economies, but whether the emerging markets were 
exposed to source country banking sectors that were ex ante more vulnerable to the financial crisis. 
Following their findings, the effect on Central America could therefore depend on whether Central 
American countries were exposed to, for example, American and European financial institutions, which 
were more vulnerable to the financial crisis.  
In order to see the extent to which the negative liquidity shock of the financial crisis was 
transmitted to Central America and what impact it had on the trade flows from the region, we have 
analyzed statistics on both global trade finance flows and flows to Central America. While there is 
anecdotal evidence of a restriction of trade finance, detailed statistics on trade finance flows have been 
scarce so far. For our analysis of global trade finance flows we have used the results of the surveys 
conducted by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). This data concerns documentary trade 
finance products and relates to the imports side of our discussion. For our analysis of trade finance flows 
to Central America we have used finance flows from foreign banks to Central American banks as a 
proxy. These statistics have to do with pre-export financing and relate to the exports side of our analysis. 
A. Global trade finance flows 
The ICC has conducted surveys on how banks view trade finance since March 2009 to gauge the impact 
of the financial crisis on documentary trade finance products. According to the ICC, these account for 
around 15-20% of the total volume of trade transactions. Information is primarily collected via a 
questionnaire and the respondents consist of financial institutions, with participation ranging from 122 to 
210 responses. The surveys have a global coverage with the number of countries surveyed ranging from 
59 to 75, and with Europe and Asia dominating the geographic distribution.  
The surveys show that a significant proportion of financial institutions report decreases in the 
value and volume of trade finance, as well as higher pricing for trade finance products as compared to 
pre-crisis levels. Figure 2 shows that a large proportion of respondents indicated decreases in the volume 
of trade finance products from 2007 to 2009. It is important to highlight that the decreases are 
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cumulative, that is, they are changes from the previous year and not from the pre-crisis period. This 
means that there are financial institutions that are decreasing their trade finance transactions from the 
already decreased volumes of the previous year. While data for the value of trade finance is missing the 
change from 2007 to 2008, it otherwise exhibits a similar pattern to the volume of trade finance. Figure 4 
shows that the financial crisis has not only led to the decrease of the volume and value of trade finance, 
but also to the deterioration of the affordability of trade finance products, as a high percentage of 
respondents indicated increases in the pricing.  
FIGURE 2 
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS INDICATING DECREASES IN THE VOLUME 
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Source: Surveys conducted by the International Chamber of Commerce. 
FIGURE 3 
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS INDICATING DECREASES IN THE VALUE OF TRADE 
FINANCE INSTRUMENTS FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR, 2009-2010 7 
 
Source: Surveys conducted by the International Chamber of Commerce. 
                                                        
6  Data for guarantees and import collections is not available for the percentage change 2007-2008.  
7  Data for the value of all trade finance instruments is not available for the percentage change from 2007 to 2008. The ICC survey 
reports the percentage of respondents indicating decreases from 2008 to 2009 as over 40%, and as 12-15% from 2009 to 2010. 
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FIGURE 4 
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS INDICATING INCREASES IN THE 













Source: Surveys conducted by the International Chamber of Commerce. 
In addition to the responses to the questionnaire, the ICC analyses SWIFT trade volume statistics; 
that is the live transaction messages sent through SWIFT network. SWIFT is a global provider of 
financial messaging services, allowing financial institutions and corporations to exchange information 
securely. Similarly to the ICC surveys, the SWIFT live transaction messages statistics concern those 
trade transactions where banks play a role; meaning trade that is not settled on an open account basis. As 
SWIFT trade traffic fell between 2007 and 2009, but started to increase again in 2010, the SWIFT trade 
traffic statistics corroborate the responses to the ICC questionnaires on the volume of trade finance. 
The picture emerging from these surveys is that of a decrease in 2008 and 2009, and of a partial 
recovery between 2009 and 2010. The findings therefore indicate that trade finance and trade are closely 
linked, with trade finance starting to decrease before the decline of trade flows at the end of 2009, and 
with the increase in trade finance preceding the recovery of world trade in 2010. It is important to note 
that the recovery has been geographically uneven. The ICC 2011 survey reports with regard to Latin 
America that while ‘liquidity has returned…there is still a market gap resulting from a general 
deterioration in the credit-worthiness of traders, coupled with greater risk aversion by commercial banks. 
As a result, the cost of trade finance in these regions remains disturbingly high.’ We should also 
highlight that while the ICC surveys indicate that trade finance flows are increasing, this does not mean 
that the their rate of growth is the same as before the financial crisis or that they can sustain the pre-crisis 
growth rate of trade. In addition, we stress that while the ICC surveys are useful in indicating the current 
trend of trade finance, they can neither predict the trend in the future, nor foresee what the particular 
situation of Central America will be. 
B. Statistics on trade finance flows in Central America 
The previous sections of this paper have shown that global trade exports and trade exports from Central 
American countries moved in the same direction in response to the global financial crisis, and how 
global trade and global flows of documentary trade finance products are linked. In this section we 
examine whether there is a link between pre-export financing flows to Central America and trade flows. 
In order to analyze the connection between trade finance flows in Central America and Central 
American trade exports, we have complied quarterly trade finance statistics for the period 2005 to 2011 
using finance flows from banks in other countries to banks in Central American countries as a proxy for 
trade finance. 8 These finance flows are mainly used for pre-export financing by banks in Central 
                                                        
8  This is a good proxy because most bank lending from abroad is for trade finance purposes. Banks from abroad lend to domestic 
banks that then provide pre-export financing to producers. 
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America. Figure 5 shows how the Central American countries started experiencing a decrease in trade 
finance flows from the third quarter of 2008 and a recovery from the third quarter of 2010, therefore 
following the pattern of global and Central American trade exports. Trade finance flows to Nicaragua 
exhibit a different pattern, however, with a 37.2% decrease between the fourth quarter of 2007 and the 
first quarter of 2008, and then a continuing decrease until the fourth quarter of 2011. The value of trade 
finance flows to Nicaragua in the fourth quarter of 2011 represents only 1.4% of the value of the peak 
trade finance flows in the fourth quarter of 2007. This situation can be explained by the financial flows 
from Venezuela to Nicaragua which have replaced cross-border banking flows as a source of funding. 
The Venezuelan government gives donations and loans to Nicaraguan companies, 9 which are then 
directed to the banking system as deposits and later lent on as pre-export credits to producers. The size 
of the donations is substantial, surpassing the sum of the total donations from the international 
community. Taking this into account, the cross-border banking flows statistics misrepresent the actual 
size of trade finance in Nicaragua.  
While detailed comparison of trade and trade finance data is difficult due to the lack of quarterly 
trade data for all of the countries, we can say that during the crisis there was a close connection between 
trade and trade finance in Central America, with all of the countries experiencing either a simultaneous 
decrease in trade and trade finance or a decrease in trade finance preceding the decrease in trade. Data 
also shows that for the majority of the countries, trade exports were growing in 2010 while the trade 
finance flows to most countries were decreasing until the fourth quarter of 2011. These countries include 
Nicaragua, which had very low trade finance flows as compared to the pre-crisis period. The trade 
finance flows, however, picked up again in late 2010 and early 2011 with all countries apart from 
Nicaragua experiencing increases in trade finance. The improvement in the world economy increased 
global demand and hence global trade in 2010, but the problems in the financial intermediation role of 
the banks kept trade finance from increasing until late 2010. Trade and trade finance in Nicaragua, 
however, continue moving in opposite directions with a decrease of trade finance of 92.1% between 
2010 and 2011. As explained earlier, this is could be explained by the financial flows from Venezuela. 
While trade finance flows to other countries have been increasing on the whole since the crisis, the flows 
are fluctuating with some quarters registering decreases. 
FIGURE 5 
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Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Panama  
Source: Data has been compiled from the reports of the financial regulators and 
central banks of the Central American countries. 
Data in thousands of US dollars. 
                                                        
9  Companies from the Alba Group. 
10  Data is not available for the Dominican Republic before the fourth quarter of 2007. 
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Despite the increases in trade flows in 2010 and in trade finance in late 2010, we can see from 
table 1 and figure 5 how in the majority of the countries both trade and trade finance flows are below 
their pre-crisis peak levels in 2010. In contrast global trade flows recovered to their 2008 peak levels in 
2010. However, although global trade flows outperformed those of Central America, according to the 
WTO global trade did not return to its previous growth path in 2010. Neither in Central America, nor 
globally did trade return to the pre-crisis growth levels. Many reasons, such as high unemployment rates 
and reduced fiscal stimuli in developed countries dampening import demand, can explain this situation. 
Our analysis of trade and trade finance data suggests that there is a connection between the two and that 
a lower supply of trade finance can also explain lower trade export growth.  
Data suggests that one of the reasons why trade exports from Central America did not recover as 
much as global trade could be decrease of trade finance products in the region. Developing countries 
tend to rely more on documentary trade finance products than on open account financing due to these 
products bringing higher security and being more appreciated (Auboin, 2011). Pre-export financing, on 
the other hand, allows developing country companies to obtain financing which may otherwise not be 
available to them. A lower supply of trade finance impact companies in developing countries harder than 
those in developed countries, given that these companies may have fewer alternative sources of finance.  
Alarmingly, the recent decrease in the supply of trade finance can also be a part of a more general 
trend. Wang and Tadesse (2005) argue that there is a long term trend of a decreased willingness of the 
banking sector to provide trade finance in times of crisis. Under modern capital markets banks have 
fewer incentives to supply trade finance because banks no longer provide both trade finance and long 
term financing. Previously banks would be more willing to supply trade finance during a crisis because 
this could help the economies of the countries to which they were supplying long term financing. Wang 
and Tadesse (2005) also cite the blurring of the distinction between trade finance and financial credits, 
and the removal of exchange rate controls and capital market liberalization in many countries as factors 
contributing to the decreased willingness to supply trade finance. These past developments in 
international finance, which restrict trade finance in times of crisis, together with the changes resulting 
from the most recent financial crisis could dampen the future growth of trade. Lower availability and 
higher prices of trade credit would be especially detrimental to developing countries for whom formal 
guarantees are often required for trade to take place.  
We should also keep in mind that some features of the Central American economies such as their 
openness, reliance on exports as drivers of growth, and their close links with developed countries, in 
particular the United States, make the region more vulnerable to negative shocks (Bustillo and Velloso, 
2012). For instance, during the recent financial crisis a number of countries from the region had their 
credit ratings downgraded. While the ratings of Costa Rica, Guatemala and Panama have recovered, 
Honduras and El Salvador have not regained their former ratings. 11 Bustillo and Velloso (2012) also 
show that the share of Central America and the Caribbean in the total bond issuance of Latin America 
has decreased since the onset of the financial crisis. 12 The bond issuance and credit ratings data point to 
an increased cost of borrowing for Central American sovereigns and corporations. The effect of the 
recent crisis on the region therefore goes beyond trade finance flows and concerns more generally the 
region’s access to international capital markets. 
 
                                                        
11  Information is from Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch. 
12  Data is based on information provided by Latin Finance, JPMorgan and Bank of America-Merrill Lynch and includes all Central 
American and Caribbean issuers.  
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V. Future effects of the financial 
crisis on Central America 
Our analysis of trade export flows and trade finance flows suggests that the 
two are connected in Central America and globally. There have been 
various studies on the reasons for the decline in trade during the recent 
crisis, with a particular focus on the United States imports. These studies on 
the United States are of specific interest to understand past and future 
effects of trade finance flows to Central America, given that the United 
States is the largest trading partner for the region. Alessandria and others 
(2010) found evidence of the role of inventory adjustment in the decline of 
imports to the United States during the financial crisis, with this being 
particularly true for the automotive sector where the inventories had become 
fairly high relative to the sales before the crisis. The empirical work of 
Levchenko and others (2010) on disaggregated data on US imports and 
exports suggests that the position of the sectors in the supply chain had an 
effect on the degree to which imports and exports declined, with a higher 
decrease taking place in sectors that are used as intermediate inputs. While 
we do not contest that inventory adjustments and supply chains may have 
also played a role in the recent decline in trade, we argue that the decline in 
trade can also be attributed to a lower supply of trade finance and that a 
higher cost of credit in general is a relevant factor. Chor and Manova 
(2009), for example, found in their empirical study on monthly US imports 
during November 2006 and October 2009 that countries with higher 
interbank rates exported less to the United States than countries with more 
favorable credit conditions. There also have been studies on the link 
between financial shocks and trade flows from emerging markets 
(Balakrishnan and others, 2011; Thomas, 2009), which show that financial  
flows are an important transmission mechanism for shocks. While Central 
American countries are not generally classified as emerging markets, the 
countries examined are closer to Central American countries than studies for 
advanced economies. 
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Having analyzed the behavior of trade flows from Central America and trade finance flows to 
Central America during the recent financial crisis, we consider what the future effects of the financial 
crisis could be for the region. While Central America has weathered the crisis relatively well thus far, 
this does not mean that further shocks from the crisis or its aftermath cannot be transmitted to the region. 
Moreover, as shown in the previous section of this paper, data on bond issuance and credit ratings in the 
region indicate that, in general, the region’s access to finance worsened during the recent crisis and, in 
case of some countries, has not yet recovered to its pre-crisis levels. Central America therefore seems to 
be particularly vulnerable to negative shocks through financial channels. 
We argue that trade finance can be a transmission channel of shocks to Central America. Trade 
finance products are important to the region as a source of finance, which maybe otherwise hard to 
obtain, and also bring higher security. If foreign financial institutions need to contract their lending, it is 
likely that trade finance flows to Central America would decrease. There are two main reasons for 
lending to contract or to grow at a slower pace than prior to the financial crisis. Firstly, many financial 
institutions are still dealing with losses from the financial crisis and there are renewed concerns over 
financial stability. Secondly, we argue that the financial crisis is changing the regulatory framework of 
the financial sector and these changes can and will have a negative effect on developing countries via 
bank lending contraction.  
A. Legacy effects of the financial crisis and new risks 
It is estimated that up to early 2010 the financial crisis had led to losses valued at US$2.3 trillion for the 
financial sector in terms of write-downs and loan provisions. 13 Furthermore, not all of the losses have yet 
been recognized on the balance sheets of financial institutions. In addition to past losses, it seems that the 
crisis is not over yet as there are renewed concerns over the stability of the global financial sector. In its 
September 2011 Global Financial Stability Report, the IMF argues that for the first time since its October 
2008 report, ‘risks to global financial stability have increased’. The continuing sovereign debt crisis in the 
euro area is of particular concern to financial stability not only for solvency reasons but also for the 
increase in liquidity risks for European banks. A number of countries in the euro area have experienced 
downgrades of their sovereign ratings amid growing concern over their economies. Despite rescue 
packages, such as the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility in 2010, the crisis continues with 
uncertainty over what the true losses could be and which countries are vulnerable. Massa and others (2011) 
refer to estimates of losses of €63 billion for euro area banks in the event of an 80% write-off of Greek 
debt. In the case that defaults on sovereign debt spread to countries other than Greece, losses for banks 
would be higher. However, even before a major default of a sovereign, sovereign risks have spilled over to 
the banking system. According to the IMF September 2011 Global Financial Stability Report, nearly half 
of the €6.5 trillion stock of government debt issued by the governments in the euro area started to have 
increased credit risk. This means that not only the governments but also the financial institutions holding 
significant amounts of the riskier sovereign debt are facing funding constraints. The IMF report also 
describes two non-direct effects on the financial sector from the sovereign debt crisis. One is a spillover of 
risks to financial institutions that have exposure to financial institutions holding risky sovereign debt. The 
other is a wider effect on the liabilities side of the balance sheets of financial institutions. The sovereign 
debt crisis of the euro area erodes the value of government guarantees, decreases the value of government 
bonds used as collateral, increases margin calls, and leads to downgrades in the ratings of financial 
institutions. All of these increased pressures on financial institutions can lead to a contraction of lending. 
We argue that trade finance can be a transmission channel of the pressures facing foreign financial 
institutions to Central America. European financial institutions both hold significant amounts of Greek 
sovereign debt and are a major source of trade finance for Central American countries, and if they have to 
contract their lending this would also impact their trade finance operations. In the case of a major default of 
a sovereign, the contraction in lending would be more severe. This would consequently affect trade finance 
flows to Central America even more.  
                                                        
13  Estimate is from the IMF Global Financial Stability Report April 2010. 
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Figure 6 illustrates the impact of losses during a financial crisis on bank lending. We see that the 
losses reduce the regulatory capital that is available to meet the regulatory capital requirements. The 
bank therefore has to either reduce its risk-weighted assets or raise more regulatory capital. Reducing the 
size or riskiness of the loan supply is one way and would likely impact lending to developing countries. 
However, losses during a financial crisis can also have other impacts. During the most recent financial 
crisis most banks actually did meet their minimum capital requirements (Demirguc-Kunt and others, 
2010). The problem was rather a loss of confidence in the financial stability of the financial sector as a 
whole and uncertainty over the location of risks, which led to an adverse liquidity shock. Bank losses 
can therefore have an indirect impact on bank lending through a systemic effect. Another issue to 
consider is the impact of losses on liquidity requirements. 14 Losses could mean that the bank no longer 
complies with regulatory liquidity requirements and therefore it has to adjust its asset composition. This 
adjustment may have an impact on lending to developing countries.  
Several studies have found evidence of the importance of bank lending in the transmission of 
shocks to other countries (Balakrishnan and others, 2011; Thomas, 2009). Following Cetorelli and 
Goldberg (2011) we argue that bank lending as a transmission channel can function in three different 
ways. In section III we referred to the work of Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) on different transmission 
channels of liquidity shocks from global banks to emerging markets, distinguishing between the case of 
a foreign parent and a domestic affiliate, and a domestically owned bank. If there is an adverse shock to 
a foreign financial institution, this institution will have reduced capital and most likely a reduced rating 
in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis. The likely approach to meet its capital requirements 
is to reduce lending and to hold on to capital. This contraction of available capital can be transmitted to a 
developing country in two main ways. If the foreign financial institution does not have affiliates in the 
developing country, it will simply reduce its cross-border lending to the financial institutions in the 
country. If the foreign financial institution has domestic affiliates in the country, it can either decrease its 
cross-border lending to the affiliate or borrow funds from the affiliate through internal capital markets to 
meet its own capital requirements. An adverse shock may also mean that the foreign financial institution 
is in breach of its liquidity requirements. In this case the institution needs to change its asset composition 
to more liquid assets (this usually favors government bonds). This adjustment may have an impact on 
lending to developing country banks. 
Interestingly, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011), in their work on emerging markets, find that the key 
factor determining the impact of an adverse shock on emerging markets is not the degree of openness of 
their economies, but whether the emerging markets were exposed to source country banking sectors that 
were ex ante more vulnerable to the financial crisis. Balakrishnan and others (2011), who studied the 
transmission of financial stress from advanced to emerging economies, suggested that degree of 
transmission depends on the extent to which the emerging countries have liabilities with advanced 
economies. They find that banks in Western Europe have been the main source of stress in the recent 
crisis. In their work on transmission channels of shocks from the euro area to developing countries, 
Massa and others (2011) discuss three possible channels: financial contagion, lower growth in the euro 
area economies and exchange rate movements. For instance, if euro area countries defaulted on their 
debt, European banks would experience significant losses and could lower lending to developing 
countries in order to meet their capital requirements. The problems in the euro area are exacerbated by 
the size of the debt (Greece owes $483 billion and Italy about $2.5 trillion) and fewer policy options due 
to the common currency. In light of the work of Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011), Balakrishnan and others 
(2011) and Massa and others (2011), the current problems in the euro area, and the role of euro area 
financial institutions as providers of trade finance to Central America, the impact on Central America of 
adverse shocks could be significant. 
                                                        
14  While liquidity requirements are already in place in some jurisdictions, the requirements are currently being strengthened 
internationally and also in some cases nationally. Basel III will introduce a Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Net Stable Funding Ratio. 
On a national level, for example, the Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom is strengthening the liquidity requirements. 
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FIGURE 6 
ILLUSTRATION OF THE EFFECTS OF LOSSES FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
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Source: Elaborated by the author. 
 
B. The effects of regulation 
The recent financial crisis has changed the regulatory landscape with significant potential effects for 
developing countries. The crisis exposed gaps in the regulation of the financial sector and led to changes 
in regulations both nationally and internationally. There have been concerns over the impact of the 
imminent Basel III (Box 1), an international regulatory framework for banks, on developing countries. 
Basel III raises minimum capital requirements for financial institutions, increases the risk coverage of 
regulations on capital requirements, and raises the quality of capital. While according to the Basel 
Committee (2010), the long term economic benefits outweigh the costs associated with Basel III, and 
even in shorter term the impact on economic growth is moderate, we suggest that the costs maybe 
disproportionate to small developing countries. The abovementioned features of Basel III may have an 
impact on lending to developing countries. Figure 7 illustrates the effects of higher capital requirements 
on bank lending. A bank has two ways of meeting higher capital requirements: either it raises more 
capital that is eligible for regulatory capital, or it reduces its risk-weighted assets. The first can be 
accomplished, for example, by injections of capital, issuing shares, or not paying dividends. The second 
can be achieved by reducing either the riskiness of the loan portfolio, or the size of the outstanding 
loans. There is a body of research incorporating regulatory capital requirements into models on bank 
lending (e.g. Van den Heuvel, 2007) with higher capital requirements acting as a constraint on lending 
activities. Notwithstanding regulatory capital ratios, banks also generally have their internal capital 
adequacy targets and research shows that banks adjust loan supply to meet these targets. Francis and 
Osborne (2009) analyzed the impact of regulatory capital requirements on lending in their study of 
around 200 banks in the United Kingdom from 1996 to 2007. They found that regulatory capital 
requirements are important for determining banks’ internal capital targets and that these internal targets 
influence banks’ loan supply. Higher capital requirements could therefore lower lending to developing 
countries, especially as lending to developing countries often attracts higher capital requirements due to 
the higher risks and therefore one way of reducing the riskiness of a loan portfolio would be to reduce 
lending to developing countries.  
Figure 7 also illustrates the effect that an increase in the risk coverage of regulations has on the 
lending activities of banks. Widening the risk coverage of regulations by including off-balance sheet items 
is one of the features of Basel III. While one of the problems in the recent financial crisis was that financial 
institutions kept many assets off their balance sheets and hence real risks were not known, bringing off-
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balance sheet items into the balance sheet has the effect of raising regulatory capital requirements. As 
explained earlier, this may also lead to a contraction of lending to developing countries.  
FIGURE 7 
ILLUSTRATION OF THE EFFECTS OF HIGHER CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS (CR) 
FOR A BANK 
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Source: Elaborated by the author. 
There are also particular concerns over the impact of Basel III on trade finance products (WTO, 
2011, World Bank, ICC). Even though documentary trade finance products are generally considered to 
be some of the lowest risk products available, as they are highly collateralized and self-liquidating, some 
provisions of Basel III may have the effect of increasing the cost of this type of trade finance products 
(Auboin, 2011). Following consultation with the WTO, World Bank and ICC, the Basel Committee 
made two changes to the Basel III capital framework. The Committee waived the one-year maturity 
floor for some trade finance products under the advanced internal ratings-based approach for credit risk. 
This is an important change as most trade finance transactions have durations that are significantly less 
than one year. The change therefore reduces capital requirements for banks using the advanced 
approach. The second change made by the Basel Committee is waiving the sovereign floor for some 
trade-finance related claims on banks using the standardized approach for credit risk. This is a 
particularly important change for developing countries. The risk weighting of a counterparty bank 
cannot be lower than the risk weighting of the country in which the bank is domiciled. The change to 
Basel III allows this floor to be waived and hence reduces the capital requirement for the exposure to a 
developing country bank, which acts as a counterparty to a trade finance transaction. The issue that 
remains is the introduction of a leverage ratio of 100% credit conversion factor on off-balance-sheet 
items. The leverage ratio will cover both on and off-balance sheet items, with the latter including trade 
finance products such as letters of credit. The transmission of this effect to Central America could be via 
higher cost documentary trade finance products for Central American imports and via higher cost 
lending to Central American banks, which will lead to an increase in the cost of pre-export financing. 
While the idea behind introducing this leverage ratio is to reduce excessive leveraging, documentary 
trade finance products are not used for leverage, as they are backed by either goods or services (Auboin, 
2011). Pre-export financing, on the other hand, is given on the condition that companies have contracts 
set up with well known companies in developed countries. The rationale of the Basel Committee of not 
amending the leverage ratio is that the calculation of this ratio was meant to be simple and not give 
different risk weightings to different types of products. Another feature of Basel III that may impact 
trade finance lending to Central America is the strengthening of liquidity requirements. Similar to capital 
requirements, liquidity requirements may not only set a regulatory ceiling for a bank’s lending activities, 
but may also affect a bank’s internal targets. Banks may choose to maintain internal liquidity ratios, 
which are higher than the regulatory requirements. Higher regulatory liquidity requirements would 
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reduce the amount of excess liquid assets that a bank wishes to hold 15 and therefore reduce lending as 
the bank would increase its liquid assets. Basel III will set a Liquidity Coverage Ratio to ensure that 
there are high quality liquid assets available for one month in case of a stress. Basel III will also 
introduce a Net Stable Funding Ratio, which will set minimum requirements for stable sources of 
funding over a one-year horizon. The effect of liquidity requirements is an increased demand for liquid 
assets, such as cash, on behalf of banks and an increase in the interest rate that banks will require as a 
return for lending. This increase in the price of lending can reduce the volume of flows to developing 
country banks and consequently the amount of pre-export financing given to developing country 
companies.  
BOX 1 
EVOLUTION OF THE BASEL INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR BANKS 
Basel I (1988) 
Simple minimum capital 
requirements:  
Based on only credit and 
market risk 
8% capital requirement on 











Basel II (2006) 
Capital requirements are more 
risk based: 
Operational risk included as a 
separate category 
Greater allowance for banks to 
use their own approaches for 
measuring risks 
Introduction of the supervisory 
review process to evaluate how 
well banks are assessing their 
capital adequacy 
Expansion of disclosure 
requirements 




Basel III  
Minimum capital requirements 
will be higher (Common Equity Tier 
1: 2% → 4.5%, Tier 1 Capital: 4% 
→ 6%, Total capital remains 8% 
but the introduction of capital 
conservation buffer gives an 
effective requirement of 10.5%) 
Will address pro-cyclicality 
through capital conservation buffers 
and countercyclical buffers 
Risk coverage will be increased 
by bringing in off-balance sheet 
items 
Introduction of a minimum Tier 
1 leverage ratio of 3%* 
Introduction of a liquidity 
coverage ratio and net stable 
funding ratio will address system 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011), Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and 
banking systems, Bank for International Settlements. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework - Comprehensive Version, Bank for International Settlements. 
Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001), The New Basel Capital Accord: an explanatory 
note, Bank for International Settlements. 
In addition, some types of borrowers can be constrained not only because of a lower supply of 
lending due to higher capital requirements or new liquidity requirements, but also because of credit 
rationing by banks. Credit rationing is understood as a situation in which there are groups of loan 
applicants who would not get a loan even if they offered to pay more but would get a loan if the credit 
supply were greater (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In their classic model Stiglitz and Weiss show how a 
bank would not want to increase the loan supply even if the loan applicants are willing to pay higher 
interest rates or to offer more collateral. The authors show that increasing the interest rates or accepting 
more collateral could increase the riskiness of the bank’s loan portfolio, ‘either by discouraging safer 
investors, or by inducing borrowers to invest in riskier projects’. The equilibrium is therefore a situation 
of credit rationing.  
The recent financial crisis was a period of credit rationing by banks. As the crisis progressed 
liquidity evaporated from the market. Banks held on to their assets due to the uncertainty over the 
location of risks and the extent of losses that would need to be written off. The scarcity of credit was 
                                                        
15  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, The policy implications of transmission channels between the financial system and the 
real economy, Working Paper No 20, May 2012. 
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accompanied by credit rationing where lending to large corporations was preferred over what were 
perceived as riskier counterparties. What suffered in particular was lending to small and medium sized 
companies (SMEs). Artola and Genre (2011), for instance, show that in the euro area SMEs were more 
affected than larger companies by the scarcity of credit during the recent financial crisis. These types of 
companies ‘have higher risk, more opacity, serious agency problems, and wider information 
asymmetries’, 16 making it harder for them to obtain credit during times of crisis.  
Developing country governments and companies often have lower credit ratings and can in 
general have more difficulty in accessing credit. However, the situation is particularly complicated for 
developing country SMEs due to credit rationing. Given that in developed economies there are policies 
in place to support SMEs, credit rationing generally constrains developing country SMEs to a greater 
extent than it does developed country SMEs. This has widespread consequences since SMEs play a vital 
role in job creation in most countries and the majority of the people in developing countries work in 
SMEs. 17 The combination of higher regulatory capital requirements and credit rationing in case of a 
renewed financial crisis can have very detrimental effects on developing country SMEs and hence 
employment in these countries. 
C. Strengths and weaknesses of the region 
The Latin American and Caribbean region has not been as affected by the recent financial crisis as most 
developed countries. In particular, the region avoided the problems it experienced during past crises, such 
as currency and debt crises and bank runs. Izquierdo and Talvi (2010) refer to the external and fiscal 
surpluses, a sound banking system, a large stock of international reserves and more flexible exchange rate 
regimes as reasons for the region’s performance. These factors added to improved macroeconomic 
conditions and allowed the governments in the region to use countercyclical monetary, fiscal, and credit 
policies to mitigate the impact of the crisis. However, Izquierdo and Talvi (2010) provide empirical 
evidence that the key factor for the region’s resilience was not only the macroeconomic fundamentals, but 
the willingness of developed countries and multilateral institutions to act as a lender of last resort to 
emerging markets. They argue that this is a marked difference from previous global crises. This suggests 
that the region is somewhat reliant on the readiness of the international community to provide assistance in 
times of crises. There may not always be the will for this.  
In addition, there are further weaknesses apparent in the region. Growth in Latin America and the 
Caribbean is expected to slow to 3.6% in 2012 (World Bank, 2012). Furthermore, many of the countries 
in Central America have growing deficits which will be harder to finance if the cost of borrowing 
increases. The growing deficits of countries, in Central America and elsewhere, have already been 
reflected in the downgrades by credit rating agencies. Some of the countries in Central America are also 
projected to have high external financing need, the cost of which could increase dramatically if there are 
adverse shocks to their lenders. Given that Nicaragua currently receives significant concessional lending 
from Venezuela, its external financing needs are very dependent on its diplomatic relations with 
Venezuela. The Central American region is also likely to be affected by the growth prospects of its main 
trading partner, the United States. Slower growth in the United States will not only affect trade, but also 
revenues from tourism and remittances. Many of the countries in Central America receive significant 
remittances, with most of them coming from the United States (World Bank, 2012).  
The World Bank (2012) predicts that the rate of growth in developed countries will continue to be 
low due to the effects of the financial crisis and that therefore developing countries will have to look for 
growth opportunities within the developing world. South-South trade tripled between 1996 and 2006, 
with nearly half of imports to developing countries coming from within the developing world (World 
Bank, 2010). South-South trade is predicted to further increase in importance in the future and to have a 
larger share of world trade than North-North trade by 2018 (ECLAC, 2011). However, one of the  
                                                        
16  The SME Financing Gap (Vol. II), Proceedings of the Brasilia Conference, 27-30 March 2006, Part 1, OECD Publishing. 
17  The SME Financing Gap (Vol. II), Proceedings of the Brasilia Conference, 27-30 March 2006, Part 1, OECD Publishing. 
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preconditions to allow for further growth is the availability of trade finance. Due to the higher perceived 
risks of developing country companies, trade finance products are particularly important for South-South 
trade. Contraction of lending to developing countries due to regulatory changes or adverse shocks from 
the recent financial crisis or the continuing euro area sovereign debt crisis may therefore, in the absence 
of apropriate public policy response, harm trade finance and consequently South-South trade. The 
increasing openness of the banking systems of Central American countries may facilitate the 
transmission of shocks. 
Another issue to keep in mind is that if world economy and financial stability deteriorate, they 
will deteriorate from an already weakened level. Countries will therefore have to cope with a second 
crisis, or further effects from the first crisis, within the framework of an already weakened global 
economy. The likely effect is that both developing and developed countries alike will be less equipped to 
withstand new shocks. The Central American region may therefore be more affected by the future effects 
of the crisis, and in particular by lending contraction from developed economies, especially because their 
fiscal position has also weakened. 
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VI. Policy recommendations 
In the previous sections we have concluded that bank lending and trade 
finance in particular are important for trade. We argue that trade finance 
can be an important transmission channel of further shocks from the 
recent financial crisis to Central America. The question then is what can 
be done to mitigate this risk.  
Mitigating the risks of trade finance being a transmission channel 
of shocks to Central America requires a combination of different urgent 
actions, and these actions must come from both Central American 
countries themselves and from developed countries and multilateral 
institutions. In their work on financial contagion, Van Rijckghem and 
Weder (2003) distinguish between ‘common-lender’ and ‘wake-up call’ 
effects. The first refers to a financial institution withdrawing from one 
country after experiencing losses elsewhere to meet its capital 
requirements. The second refers to either a general shift in risk aversion or 
a change in perception for an entire class of assets. We refer to their 
proposals on different policy actions to confront these two different effects 
and use them in the context of Central America. With respect to the 
common-lender effect, Central American countries must diversify their 
sources of trade financing and avoid borrowing significantly from one 
single creditor (reduce concentration risk). Balakrishnan and others (2011) 
suggested that the degree of transmission depends on the extent to which 
the emerging countries have liabilities with specific advanced economies. 
Their work supports the view that diversifying sources of funding would 
mitigate the risk of transmission of adverse shocks. This can be done 
through the opening of new sources of credit in emerging market countries 
such as China, India, Brazil and Mexico. On the other hand in the case of 
a ‘wake-up call’ effect Van Rijckghem and Weder (2003) propose that 
countries should lengthen the maturity structure of their debt and rely 
more on foreign direct investment than debt financing. In the context of  
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trade finance, a ‘wake-up call’ effect can be addressed through regional institutions like CABEI, with a call 
for political action coming from CABEI and Governors of the bank forcing their institution to comply with 
its mandate.  
During the crisis regional development banks increased the lending capacity of their trade finance 
facilitation programmes. For instance, in 2009 the IADB increased the size of its Trade Finance 
Facilitation Program from $400 million to $1 billion. In May 2009 the Global Trade Liquidity Program 
was set up by a number of multilateral development banks and donor countries. Latin America and the 
Caribbean received about one third of the volume of the programme. These types of programmes can 
improve access to trade finance for some sectors and can be used in a targeted manner to, for instance, 
improve the access of SMEs, which otherwise may not be able to use trade finance products.  
CABEI strategy must be revised under the light of a possible liquidity risk in the Central 
American financial market and trade finance credit instruments must be developed so they are ready if 
needed. In contrast to other multilateral development banks with operations in Central America, CABEI 
is managed by the countries of the region. This puts the bank in a unique position to support Central 
American countries with trade financing. Trade finance funding from CABEI could be more 
competitively priced than funding from non-regional banks. There are a number of ways in which 
CABEI could facilitate trade finance. First, the bank could sell bonds now, when it can obtain 
inexpensive credit and set up a fund for trade finance with the proceeds. This fund can be used in the 
case of crisis. If CABEI waits until the next crisis to sell bonds, the price of credit will likely rise 
substantially. Secondly, CABEI could raise funds from donors to be placed in the trade finance fund. 
The Non-Regional member countries of the bank include Republic of China (Taiwan) and Mexico. In 
addition, given the increasing role of China in Central America, this country could be a possible donor 
for a trade finance fund. Lastly, CABEI could guarantee debt issued by well rated Central American 
financial institutions.  
Some of the countries that weathered the recent financial crisis well ensured the availability of 
credit for SMEs, by using national development banks. Brazil experienced a GDP contraction of only 
0.6% in 2009 and robust growth of 7.5% in 2010. India performed even better with a GDP growth of 
9.1% in 2009, followed by 8.8% in 2010. Both countries quickly injected funds into government-owned 
export-import banks and state development banks so that liquidity could be restored. In Brazil the funds 
were mainly channeled through BNDES, the Brazilian Development Bank. For instance, in early 2009 
BNDES was given a credit facility amounting to 3.3% of the GDP, which ‘aimed at augmenting its 
credit for working capital and for small and medium-sized enterprises as well as for boosting private 
investment in sectors with high income multiplier effects’ (Nassif, 2010). The lending activities of 
BNDES have in fact grown to such an extent that they are no longer limited to activities within Brazil 
(Monteiro and Gradilone, 2009). In India the government implemented a rapid fiscal stimulus package at 
the onset of the crisis, including additional support for exports and credit for small enterprises (Nassif, 
2010). India’s initial fiscal stimuli amounted to an additional public spending of around 3% of GDP in 
the fiscal year 2008-2009 (Nassif, 2010).  
Central American countries should consider strengthening the role of CABEI with regard to trade 
finance funds, and, at national level, setting up or giving more resources to national development banks or 
supporting well rated commercial banks specialized in SMEs. The latter can also help companies in the 
region outside of a crisis. According to Titelman (2003) and Alcas (2005), there is a not a sufficient supply 
of long-term lending in Latin America despite financial reforms in the 1990s, with SMEs and relatively 
higher risk sectors being particularly affected. A national development bank can help to ensure a better 
supply of lending and higher production in Central America (Titelman, 2003). However, there is no one 
way to set up or increase the role of a national development bank, and each country must find a solution 
that suits its needs and characteristics (Alcas, 2005). 
Another way of diversifying funding sources is a better use of export credit agencies. Over time 
developing country export credit agencies could play a role in both diversifying sources of trade finance 
and in increasing supply. Considering the growing importance of both South-South trade and the 
significant amount of trade that takes place within Central America, developing country export credit 
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agencies could also become a source of know-how on South-South and regional trade. In the short run 
the key action is to strengthen the technical capacity of developing country export credit agencies wether 
they are public or private. Developed country export credit agencies already provide technical assistance 
for least developed countries to set up export credit agencies; for example, there is cooperation in Asia 
between the Asian Development Bank, the Berne Union and local export credit agencies (Auboin, 2007). 
Similar arrangements could strengthen export credit agencies in Central America through CABEI, IDB 
or the World Bank. In our view coordinated action on mitigating a possible contraction in the supply of 
trade finance is essential.  
Mitigating the second effect described by Van Rijckghem and Weder (2003), the ‘wake-up call’ 
effect, requires ensuring that regulation on trade finance products is appropriate. In the previous section 
we described some concerns over the effect of Basel III on the supply and cost of trade finance products. 
Regulation of trade finance products must be appropriate for the risks of trade finance products, which 
are normally low. The recent financial crisis led to a general shift in risk aversion and reduced 
willingness of financial institutions to lend. One way of mitigating this ‘wake-up call’ effect for trade 
finance products is to design regulatory capital requirements in such a way that they do not discourage 
trade finance lending at national and regional level, for the later it will be essencial that the Central 
American Council of Bank Supervisors include such issues on their agenda.  
In any case for both the ‘wake-up call effect’ and the ‘common-lender’ effect, it is important that 
an appropriate framework is in place before a crisis, and that countries and institutions take the necessary 
actions quickly when a crisis begins. For instance, Nassif (2010) compares the economic performance of 
Brazil and India during the recent financial crisis and shows how India weathered the crisis better due to 
its prompt reaction to the crisis. However speed is not the only relevant consideration; the reaction to a 
crisis must also be coordinated between the different actors. It is essential that cooperation between 
national development banks, and regional and multilateral development banks, as well as governments 
and other domestic agents, be coordinated in order to avoid any duplication. By having an appropriate 
framework in place before a crisis we are not only referring to a suitable network of institutions, which 
can respond to a crisis, but also to appropriate pre-crisis conditions. 
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VII. Conclusion 
This paper examined trade finance as a transmission channel of future 
adverse shocks to Central America. We found that trade finance and trade 
flows followed the same pattern during the recent financial crisis with 
trade finance flows declining before the decrease in trade exports from 
Central America. While the region has so far weathered the financial crisis 
well, in this paper we considered several reasons why further shocks could 
be transmitted to the region via a contraction in the supply of trade 
finance. The financial crisis led to both weakened balance sheets of 
financial institutions and the need for stronger regulation. These factors 
together with the continuing euro area sovereign debt crisis could lead to a 
lower supply of trade finance to Central America. In order to mitigate the 
consequences of this risk it is essential for the countries in the region to 
diversify their sources of funding and not rely on a small number of 
creditors. CABEI can help to ensure that there is a better supply of trade 
finance in the event of a crisis by building up a trade finance fund before a 
crisis and by guaranteeing debt issued by well rated Central American 
financial institutions during a crisis. National development banks and an 
increased role for export credit agencies are additional ways to diversify 
funding sources for the region. At the same time multilateral development 
banks must increase the capacity of their trade facilitation programmes, 
and the international community should ensure that there is a process for 
increasing funds in case of severe adverse shocks to the global financial 
system. Lastly, it is important that regulations give appropriate treatment 
to trade finance products and do not discourage lending for trade finance 
purposes. For this to be done, proper action of the Central American 
Banks Supervisors Council is needed. 
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